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Bit commitment is a fundamental cryptographic primitive in which Bob wishes to commit a
secret bit to Alice. Perfectly secure bit commitment is impossible through asynchronous exchange
of quantum information. Perfect security is however possible when Alice and Bob split into several
agents exchanging classical and quantum communication at times and locations suitably chosen
to satisfy specific relativistic constraints. Here we report an implementation of a bit commitment
protocol using quantum communication and special relativity. Our protocol is based on [A. Kent,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 109, 130501 (2012)] and has the advantage that it is practically feasible with
arbitrary large separations between the agents in order to maximize the commitment time. By
positioning agents in Geneva and Singapore, we obtained a commitment time of 15 ms. A security
analysis considering experimental imperfections and finite statistics is presented.
Bit commitment is a fundamental primitive with sev-
eral applications such as coin tossing [1] and secure vot-
ing [2]. In a bit commitment protocol, Bob commits a
secret bit to Alice at a given instant which he can choose
to reveal some time later. Security here means that if
Bob is honest, then his bit is perfectly concealed from Al-
ice until he decides to open the commitment and reveal
his bit. Furthermore, if Alice is honest, then it should
be impossible for Bob to change his mind once the com-
mitment is made. That is, the only bit he can reveal is
the one he originally committed himself to. Information-
theoretically secure bit commitment in a setting where
the two parties exchange classical messages in an asyn-
chronous fashion is impossible. An extensive amount of
work was devoted to study asynchronous quantum bit
commitment, for which perfect security was ultimately
shown to be impossible [3, 4] as well (see also [5, 6]).
This does not preclude the existence of protocols with
partial (but less-than-complete) bias [7–10], which have
been the subject of related experimental work [11–13].
Bit commitment was also demonstrated experimentally
using the assumption of noisy quantum storage [14]. Al-
ternatively, perfectly secure relativistic protocols based
on the exchange of quantum and classical bits have been
proposed [15–18]. We focus here on the protocol [18],
which is proven secure in the ideal case (i.e. with per-
fect devices) [19, 20] and in the presence of losses [19].
In this Letter, we present the first experimental imple-
mentation of a secure bit commitment protocol that is
based on quantum communication and relativistic con-
straints, along with a security proof taking into account
its experimental imperfections.
Let us briefly describe the original protocol [18].
Fig. 1a shows the evolution of the protocol in a space-
time diagram. Bob wants to commit a bit b to Alice. The
protocol starts when Alice sends a group of N single pho-
tons to Bob (all photons arrive to Bob at the same time).
The quantum state of each photon is chosen at random
among the four BB84 states. Bob then immediately and
simultaneously measures all photons in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis
to commit to b = 0, or in the {|+〉, |−〉} basis to commit
to b = 1, where |±〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2. This constitutes
the commitment phase. Let us now denote ri
(b) the mea-
surement result of the ith photon. Bob then immediately
sends at light-speed the array r(b) = {b, r1(b), . . . , rN (b)}
to trusted agents B1 and B2 that are symmetrically lo-
cated on each side of Bob and that are separated by a
straight-line distance d. Communication from Bob to
each agent is encrypted using pre-shared key material.
Once agents B1 and B2 have received r
(b), they can (if
they choose) later simultaneously communicate r(b) to
the trusted agents of Alice, A1 and A2, who are sitting
right next to B1 and B2, respectively. This opens the
commitment. The commitment is accepted when A1 and
A2 later verify they have indeed received the same strings
at the same time, and that the measurement results are
consistent with the states she sent (hence security in-
creases with N). The duration of the commitment is
d/2c, where c is the speed of light. Note that Bob’s
agents do not have to open the commitment as soon as
they receive the string r(b), they can wait for as long as
they wish. However, Alice has to consider that a cheating
Bob could have stored the qubits in a quantum memory
and retrieved them at the very last instant for the mea-
surement. Hence, Alice’s agents can only be sure that
Bob was committed between to − d/2c and to, where to
is the instant when they received r(b).
This original protocol presently appears impractical for
terrestrial implementations with existing devices for di-
rect bit commitments. The main reason is that imper-
fect preparation of true single photon states, combined
with inefficient and slow single-photon detectors, seems
unlikely to allow Alice to send, and Bob to detect, suffi-
ciently many high-quality qubits in a time that is negli-
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FIG. 1. a) Space-time (x-t) diagram of the protocol of [18].
b) The relativistic portion of a modified version of (a). The
quantum exchange between Alice and Bob happens much be-
fore and is not shown.
gibly small compared to d/2c (i.e. at most 21.25 ms for d
bounded by the Earth’s diameter). Another problem is
that it seems difficult for an honest Bob to communicate
r(b) to his agents at near light speed unless either there is
a free-space line-of-sight communication channel between
them, which requires d . 200 km or so on Earth, or
else neutrino pulses are sent through Earth to detectors,
which requires expensive technology not widely available.
The protocol can be made more practical using a
delayed-choice commitment; see Fig. 1-b. Specifically,
the protocol starts when Alice and Bob exchange quan-
tum bits, but the measurement basis of Bob, denoted b,
is chosen at random and is not correlated with the bit
he wishes to commit to. In this way, the quantum ex-
change can happen at any time and location before the
commitment phase (defined below). In our implementa-
tion, after measuring all the quantum bits, Bob privately
communicates the results to agents B1 and B2 separated
by d, and also tells Alice which of the qubits she sent
yielded a click in one of his detectors. This is important:
Alice needs to know before the commitment phase which
qubits were detected by Bob, otherwise there is a sim-
ple attack he can perform to break the protocol. Bob’s
agents are now ready to start the commitment. For this,
in our implementation, they simultaneously send at in-
stant tc a bit b
′ = b⊕ a to the nearby agents A1 and A2
of Alice, where a is the bit that Bob actually wants to
commit himself to and b is the randomly committed bit.
Note that as b is random, it effectively forms a one-time
pad with which Bob encrypts a, and hence Alice cannot
learn a from b′. At time tc + d/2c, B1 and B2 simultane-
ously reveal a and r(b), and A1 and A2 can check if the
measurement results are consistent with b. The time tc
is chosen by Bob’s agents.
Security against a malicious Alice in the ideal case is
obvious, since Bob does not reveal any information about
his quantum measurement until the opening of the com-
mitment.
Security against a malicious Bob follows from special
relativity [18–21], relying only on communication con-
straints that special relativity imposes. In relativistic
cryptography, defining and analysing secure bit commit-
ment requires specifying the possible spacetime coordi-
nates of all information inputs and outputs [21], consid-
ering all possible spacetime locations of agents of each
party. It is thus important to note that our protocol does
not guarantee to Alice that either B1 or B2, or any other
agent of Bob’s, knew the committed bit at time tc. A
technologically unlimited Bob could, for example locate
an agent, B0, halfway between B1 and B2, who retains
Alice’s quantum states until time tc, generates the bit
b at that time, and sends the measurement outcomes at
light speed to B1 and B2. B1 and B2 could “blindly” ini-
tiate the commitment at time tc by each sending a shared
random bit b′ to A1 and A2, and later unveil by returning
the measurement data corresponding to b together with
the bit a = b′ ⊕ b effectively committed by B0. However,
our implementation does guarantee to Alice that Bob’s
agents collectively commit Bob to a by time tc in the
given frame, ensuring Bob is committed from at least tc
to tc + d/2c.
It is important to realize that in the security proof
it is enough to use the communication constraints im-
posed by special relativity. Specifically, we assume that
no communication between B1 and B2 is possible after
the commitment phase is completed. Quantum communi-
cation gives the advantage that Alice does need to share
any secret data with her agents, A1 and A2. On the other
hand, if she tells them what quantum states were used
in the commitment phase, then the dishonest Bob will
be instantaneously caught cheating at the unveiling. For
more information about the quantum advantage in these
scenarios please refer to Appendix E.
Note that our protocol can straightforwardly be mod-
ified to use three (or more) separated agents of Bob’s
which gives certain advantages (for details refer to Ap-
pendix F). In the two-site protocol implemented, our se-
curity proof relies on the fact that not only is communica-
tion between B1 and B2 impossible between commitment
and unveiling, but no other agent of Bob’s can send clas-
sical or quantum information generated at any location
3after tc that reaches them both by tc+(d/(2c)). Hence in
the open phase B1 and B2 must generate their answers
using disjoint quantum systems, which cannot have been
jointly acted upon by any agent of Bob’s after tc.
We now discuss how experimental imperfections are
taken into account in the security proof. Full details, in-
cluding a step-wise description of all protocols, are given
in the supplemental material. In practice, qubits sent by
Alice can come from attenuated laser pulses yielding a
Poisson distribution of the number of photons of mean
value µ. Pulses containing two or more photons prepared
in the same quantum state can be split and measured by
a malicious Bob in both bases. Using these results only,
Bob’s agents are no longer bound to a single quantum
state for each declared detection, and they can choose
to reveal the result (and the basis) of their choice, pro-
vided it is the same for B1 and B2, without introducing
any errors in r(b). Losses from Alice to Bob thus become
important. Of all the pulses sent by Alice, only a frac-
tion will yield a click in Bob’s detectors. This fraction
must therefore come from a majority of single-photon
pulses, otherwise a cheating Bob can declare a detection
only when Alice’s pulse contains two or more photons at
the output of her lab. Finally, Bob can try to cheat by
measuring each photon in a basis that will minimize his
probability of creating an error in r(b) when he opens a
bit which he was not committed to. While this proba-
bility can be minimized, it will always be strictly greater
than zero.
Let us assume that Alice sends N pulses of light each
containing on average µ photons. Bob later declares that
n of these pulses generated clicks in one of his detec-
tors (and their labels, so that Alice knows the state she
sent for each detection). Let pdet = n/N be the esti-
mated detection probability declared by Bob. After Bob
reveals r(b), Alice calculates the number of bits n′ for
which the preparation and measurement bases were the
same, as well as the number of errors nerr on these bits
(with respect to the states she sent). The qubit error
rate (QBER) is defined as nerr/n
′. In the limit N →∞,
the protocol can be shown to be secure if
pdet >
1− e−µ(1 + µ)
1− QBERλ
, (1)
where λ = 12
(
1− 1√
2
)
≈ 0.146. To take into account
the finite statistics, Alice and Bob both agree before the
protocol on a maximal QBER value (denoted δ) and a
minimal detection probability (denoted γ): only those
rounds of N pulses where pdet > γ will be used to do a
commitment. Moreover, at the end of the protocol, Alice
accepts Bob’s commitment only if the QBER < δ and if
the timings of the two opening phases guarantee that no
agent of Bob’s can have communicated with both B1 and
B2 between the commitment and unveiling.
Note that, on the one hand, suitable thresholds should
be chosen to yield a robust protocol, i.e. the probabil-
ity for it to fail when both parties are honest should be
Int
ern
et l
ink
Internet link
Vectis Vectis
QKD system
FPGA FPGA 2.5 Gbps comm. link
GPS
clockAntenna
A1 B1
Alice Bob
to A2 
Singapore
to B2 
Singapore
FIG. 2. Experimental setup located in Geneva. The setup
located in Singapore is the same except for A1 and B1 that
are replaced by A2 and B2, and that there is no QKD system.
negligibly small. On the other hand, this increases the
probability  for Bob to succeed in opening any value that
he may desire after the commitment phase. The proba-
bility  can be calculated as shown in the supplemental
material.
We implemented the modified protocol described
above (Fig. 1-b). Thanks to its simplification, the quan-
tum part can be implemented with a quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD) system using weak coherent pulses. In
particular, we used a commercial quantum key distri-
bution system “Vectis 5100” by ID Quantique. This
system is based on the two-way “Plug-and-Play” con-
figuration [22]: light pulses travel back-and-forth from
Bob to Alice through a short optical fibre with negligible
loss. When a pulse arrives on Alice side, she prepares the
qubit and attenuates the light power down to the desired
µ. In order to prevent trojan-horse attacks, the incoming
power is continuously monitored [23]. The system was in-
stalled in a office at the University of Geneva (see Fig. 2).
The optical setup is divided in two quantum boxes that
are respectively controlled by Alice and Bob, and that
are connected by an optical fibre only. The quantum box
of Alice (or Bob) records the relevant information for the
protocol and communicates with agents A1 and A2 (or
B1 and B2) through the internet.
One important modification to how the system oper-
ates in QKD needs to be done. Indeed, in QKD, Al-
ice and Bob cooperate against an external eavesdropper,
while in bit commitment they are potential adversaries.
Hence, the software was modified to eliminate all the clas-
sical communication used for key sifting except for one
thing, namely the reporting of which of the pulses sent
by Alice generated a click in one of Bob’s detectors. One
side-channel attack then needs to be considered. Indeed,
the probability pdet of Bob’s honest apparatus might de-
pend on the basis in which he measures. Alice could then
exploit this difference to gain information about Bob’s
measurement basis, which is an issue for two-party pro-
tocols [24]. To eliminate this attack, Bob can test his
4system for an imbalance, and correct it. In practice, we
monitored during 40 hours the detection probability for
each measurement basis, and found a ratioR = (95±1)%.
To eliminate this bias, we programmed Bob’s quantum
box to declare a detection in the most probable basis
with a probability R. The measurement results of Bob
are communicated to Bob’s agents through the internet
over a one-time-pad encrypted channel. Similarly, the
list of states sent by Alice and for which Bob declared a
detection is one-time-pad encrypted and sent to Alice’s
agents.
Classical agents A1 and B1 were also located in an
office at the University of Geneva, while A2 and B2
were in an office on the campus of the National Uni-
versity of Singapore (see Fig. 2). The straight-line dis-
tance (through the Earth) between the two locations is
about 9354 km, corresponding to a commitment time of
d/2c = 15.6 ms. This is close to the theoretical maximal
value of ≈ 21.2 ms achievable with antipodal points on
the surface of the Earth. A representation of the experi-
mental setup is depicted in Fig. 2. Each of the classical
agents is a standalone computer equipped with a field-
programmable gate array (FPGA) programmed to exe-
cute the necessary steps of the protocol. Each FPGA is
synchronized to universal time using a global position-
ing system (GPS) clock from Oscilloquartz. Communi-
cation between B1 and A1 (and similarly for B2 and A2)
is done over a 2.5 Gbps optical link. The time required to
communicate 7000 bits (which is a typical length for the
string r(b)) is about 3 µs, which is effectively negligible
compared to 15 ms. The opening phase is thus consid-
ered to happen instantaneously. The time at which each
step of the protocol occurred was measured with a time-
to-digital converter and was found to be precise to within
a fraction of a microsecond.
We realized fifty bit commitments by measuring in ba-
sis b = 0, and fifty more in basis b = 1, all of these
with a µ = (5.0 ± 0.5) × 10−2, where the uncertainty
corresponds to slightly overestimated daily fluctuations.
Figures 3-a and 3-b display, respectively, the histogram of
the observed pdet and of QBER for these commitments.
The optical transmission from Alice to Bob, including
detector efficiency was of the order of 6%, yielding a
mean detection probability, pdet, of 0.32% (this includes
the contribution of dark counts and multiphoton pulses).
The QBER varied between 2.8 and 4.3% and averaged
at 3.4%. The difference between the observed detection
probabilities in bases “0” and “1” are attributed to sta-
tistical fluctuations.
Given the characterization described above, we choose
to set the maximal tolerable value of the QBER to
δ = 5% which, when combined with the average µ, yield a
value of 0.16% for the right-hand side of the asymptotic
security condition (Eq. 1). For the minimum tolerable
detection probability γ, we choose a value of 0.2% for
with N = 220 × 104 pulses sent by Alice. The number
of detections declared by Bob was about 7000 per com-
mitment. The security parameter with these numbers is
FIG. 3. a) Histogram of pdet for one hundred commitments.
The blue (red) histogram shows the commitments made in
basis b = 0 (b = 1). b) Histogram of the observed QBERs in
each basis.
FIG. 4. Secure (grey) and insecure (white) regions corre-
sponding to our experimental setup. The point corresponds
to one of the commitments. The horizontal error bar corre-
spond to the uncertainty on µ, and the vertical one to the
statistical uncertainty in estimating pdet for this particular
commitment. Note that the point is well within the secure
region, which was also the case for all the other commitments
performed (not shown).
 ≤ 5.5 × 10−8. Figure 4 shows the asymptotic values
of pdet as a function of µ delimiting the secure region (in
grey) from the insecure one (in white). The experimental
point shown corresponds to one of the hundred commit-
ments we realized. All the other ones are also within
the secure region, which highlights the robustness of the
5implementation.
We have demonstrated for the first time the possibility
of implementing practical and secure bit commitment us-
ing quantum communication and special relativity, using
a protocol with significant quantum advantages. Our im-
plementation also demonstrates the possibility of imple-
menting such commitments in real time for data acquired
at a single location. This kind of system could potentially
be useful in the high-speed trading stock market where
short term commitments are sufficient. One of its main
advantage is that the quantum part of the protocol can
happen at any time before the committing phase. Hence,
quantum data can be accumulated and communicated to
agents located far away. The commitment time can in
principle be multiplied [15] if Bob commits himself to all
the bits of r(b) instead of opening the commitment, and
this strategy can be refined [16] to sustain commitments
indefinitely with constant communication rates (although
security of indefinite commitments against general quan-
tum attacks has not been proven). It would be an inter-
esting theoretical and experimental challenge to extend
the unconditionally secure commitment time significantly
beyond the 15 ms obtained here.
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6Appendix A: Security Analysis
1. Outline
We begin our security analysis by describing how we model the honest and dishonest scenarios, i.e. what assumptions
are made on the devices used to execute the protocol. In Section A 4 we describe a generalized protocol, in which
the states emitted by Alice in the commit phase do not need to be exactly the four BB84 states and Bob’s answer in
the open phase does not need to match exactly the string encoded by Alice. For this fault-tolerant RBC protocol we
present a security proof and compute an explicit security bound as a function of the number of qubits exchanged in
the commit phase. This allows us to deal with errors on the communication channel in the experiment, but not yet
with losses. Note that we do not simply extend the analysis of [20], but in fact our analysis is based on entirely new
techniques that can - as a byproduct - also be used to obtain better parameters for the idealised setting. In Section A 5
we finally make our protocol robust against errors and losses. In particular, we show how the fault-tolerant RBC can
be extended to deal with the presence of losses. We investigate how good the devices owned by the honest parties
need to be to result in a protocol that is both robust and secure in the asymptotic limit. Finally, we show how to
compute explicit security bounds for a finite-length protocol.
2. Modelling the experiment
Our model hinges on the following assumptions:
1. Alice uses a weak-coherent source with phase randomization.
2. Every photon is subject to independent noise and loss processes.
3. The detectors used by Bob for different bases have the same efficiency (independent of the state).
In the following we elaborate on what thes assumptions mean for the honest and dishonest scenarios.
a. The honest scenario
Assuming that Alice uses a weak-coherent source with phase randomisation the ensemble emitted by the source is
described by
ρ =
∞∑
r=0
pr|r〉〈r |,
where pr = e
−µ · µ
r
r!
,
µ is the average number of photons per pulse and |r〉 is the Fock state of r photons. To model noise and losses
between Alice and Bob for every photon we introduce an independent, binary random variable. Let η be the detection
efficiency: every photon emitted by the source gets detected on Bob’s side with probability η, otherwise it is lost.
Applying such a process to the original state simply affects the probability distribution: the probability of Bob
detecting r photons equals
pr(µ, η) = e
−µη · (µη)
r
r!
. (A1)
Now, suppose that n rounds are played (these are independent due to Assumption 2) and let Nr be the random
variable counting the number of rounds in which exactly t photons were received. Then
Pr[Nr = k] =
(
n
k
)
pkr (1− pr)n−k and E[Nr] = prn. (A2)
We model bit-flip errors in a similar way. For every photon detected on Bob’s side and measured in the correct
basis we introduce a bit flip error with probability Q.
7b. Dishonest scenarios
In the case of one party being dishonest we need to assume that his/her devices are perfect — we want to achieve
security against all-powerful adversaries. On the other hand, our assumptions still apply to the honest party.
If Alice is honest then we model her source as described before but now no losses or errors are guaranteed. Hence,
what Bob sees are light pulses containing a Poisson-distributed (with parameter µ) number of photons. Moreover, we
assume that Bob can do a perfect photon-counting experiment, which might help him to cheat. Bob can locate any
number of agents anywhere in space-time, send classical or quantum information, including the quantum states sent
by Alice, securely between his agents at light speed, and carry out arbitrary quantum operations on Alice’s states and
any ancillae.
If Bob is honest then we make no assumptions on the state emitted by Alice but we assume that the detectors Bob
is using for the two different bases have the same efficiency (and that it does not depend on the state prepared by
Alice).
3. Notation
We also fix some notation. Let [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} and Cn = {0, 1}n. For θ ∈ Cn define the following sets
S = {k ∈ [n] : θk = 0},
T = {k ∈ [n] : θk = 1}.
Note that S ∪ T = [n] and S ∩ T = ∅. The (normalised) Hamming distance between two strings x, y ∈ Cn is
dH(x, y) :=
1
n
∣∣{k ∈ [n] : xk 6= yk}∣∣.
The Hamming weight is defined as the distance from the string of all zeroes:
wH(x) := dH(x, 00 . . . 0).
4. Fault-tolerant RBC
The protocol presented in this section is essentially the original protocol in [18] with the following two extensions:
• In the original protocol Alice is required to create random BB84 states. In other words, she is required to generate
two uniformly random bits, x, θ ∈ {0, 1}, and create the state Hθ|x〉 of a qubit. We relax this constraint and
simply require the two states for the same value of θ to be orthogonal: if |ψθx〉 is the state corresponding to the
random variables being x and θ then we require
〈ψ00 |ψ01〉 = 〈ψ10 |ψ11〉 = 0,
which for qubit states implies
|ψ00〉〈ψ00 |+ |ψ01〉〈ψ01 | = |ψ10〉〈ψ10 |+ |ψ11〉〈ψ11 | = 1. (A3)
The assumption that each pair forms a basis means that any prepare-and-measure scheme can be turned into
an entanglement-based one. It will become evident from the security proof that the maximally incompatible
states (e.g. the BB84 states) are the optimal choice from the security point of view.
• The strings that Bob’s agents, Bill (B1) and Brian (B2), unveil in the open phase do not have to match Alice’s
string exactly. The opening will be accepted as long as Bill (B1) and Brian (B2) unveil the same string and it
is close (in terms of Hamming distance) to the one measured by Alice.
a. The protocol
Let δ be the error threshold and n be the number of rounds that Alice and Bob agree to play.
81. In every round Alice’s agent Anne (A1) generates two uniformly random bits, xk, θk ∈ {0, 1}, and sends a pulse
of photons in the state |ψθx〉 to Bill (B1).
2. (commit) Bill chooses the bit he wants to commit to, denoted by b. He measures all the incoming photons in
the computational basis if b = 0 or in the Hadamard basis if b = 1. Let y denote the string of measurement
outcomes. Bill sends b and y to Brian (B2).
3. (open) To open the commitment Bill sends b and y to Anne and Brian does the same to Amy (A2). Let us
denote the respective variables by b′ and y′.
4. Amy forwards the string she received from Brian to Anne.
5. (verify) Let xS(T ) be the substring of x on the set S(T ) as defined in Section A 3. Alice accepts the unveiling
if the following three conditions are satisfied:
• Bill and Brian unveil the same value, b = b′.
• Bill and Brian submit the same outcome string, y = y′.
• The string y is consistent with Alice’s original encoding. More specifically, if b = 0 we require dH(xS , yS) ≤
δ, whereas if b = 1 we require dH(xT , yT ) ≤ δ.
b. Security for honest Alice
A dishonest Bob can locate agents anywhere in space-time and transmit classical and quantum information between
them securely at light speed. However, the relativistic signalling constraints implied by the timings in our protocol
mean that the quantum states controlled respectively by Bill and Brian at the unveiling stage belong to disjoint Hilbert
spaces that cannot have interacted since the commitment time tc. We can thus restrict attention to the Hilbert spaces
defining Bill and Brian’s possible states at unveiling and to Bill and Brian’s actions on these spaces.
We use the security model discussed in [20], in particular, we employ the global command scenario. Suppose that
at the beginning of the open phase Bill and Brian receive a message asking them to unveil the bit b and let pb be the
probability that they succeed. We will show that for any strategy
p0 + p1 ≤ 1 + ε, (A4)
where ε decays exponentially in n, the number of rounds played.
The most general strategy by cheating Bob is to apply a quantum channel that “splits up” the quantum state into
two parts: one of which is sent to Bill at or before unveiling, while the other is sent to Brian at or before unveiling.
In the open phase, each of the agents will know which bit they are trying to unveil and will perform an arbitrary
measurement on their respective systems to find out what answers they should send to Alice’s agents.
Hence, the cheating strategy consists of a splitting channel and four POVMs (each agent has two different measure-
ments depending on what they are trying to unveil). Let the measurement operators corresponding to Bill (Brian)
trying to unveil b be {P by}y∈Cn ({Qby}y∈Cn). Note that we can without loss of generality assume that these measure-
ments are projective (by Neumark’s dilation theorem since we make no assumptions on the dimension of the quantum
state).
Moreover, let us purify the protocol. Generating one of the four states satisfying (A3) uniformly at random is
equivalent to creating an EPR pair, and measuring one half of it in one of the two bases with equal probability. It
is clear that the two protocols are equivalent from the security point of view but the purified version turns out to be
easier to analyse.
Let θ ∈ Cn be the basis string that Alice picks uniformly at random. Then her measurement operators take the
form |xθ〉 = ⊗nk=1 |ψθkxk〉 for x ∈ Cn. Now, the checks that Alice performs can be written as projectors. Let Πθb be the
projector corresponding to Alice accepting the unveiling of b given that her basis string is θ. Then
Πθ0 =
∑
x∈Cn
|xθ〉〈xθ | ⊗
∑
y∈Cn
dH(xS ,yS)≤δ
P 0y ⊗Q0y,
Πθ1 =
∑
x∈Cn
|xθ〉〈xθ | ⊗
∑
y∈Cn
dH(xT ,yT )≤δ
P 1y ⊗Q1y.
9Let ρ be the tripartite state shared between Alice, Bill and Brian. Then the probability of successfully unveiling b
can be written as
pb = 2
−n ∑
θ∈Cn
tr(ρΠθb).
We want to bound p0 + p1, which corresponds to
p0 + p1 = 2
−n ∑
θ∈Cn
tr
(
ρ[Πθ0 + Π
θ
1]
)
. (A5)
Adding the two projectors up yields
Πθ0 + Π
θ
1 =
∑
x∈Cn
|xθ〉〈xθ | ⊗
[ ∑
y∈Cn
dH(xS ,yS)≤δ
P 0y ⊗Q0y +
∑
y∈Cn
dH(xT ,yT )≤δ
P 1y ⊗Q1y
]
.
The terms in the square bracket can be upper bounded by replacing one of the measurement operators by the identity
matrix. Therefore,∑
y∈Cn
dH(xS ,yS)≤δ
P 0y ⊗Q0y +
∑
y∈Cn
dH(xT ,yT )≤δ
P 1y ⊗Q1y ≤
( ∑
y∈Cn
dH(xS ,yS)≤δ
P 0y
)
⊗ 1 + 1⊗
( ∑
y∈Cn
dH(xT ,yT )≤δ
Q1y
)
≤ 1⊗ 1 +
∑
y∈Cn
dH(xS ,yS)≤δ
P 0y ⊗
∑
z∈Cn
dH(xT ,zT )≤δ
Q1z,
where we applied the following operator inequality in the last step:
A⊗ 1 + 1⊗B = 1⊗ 1 +A⊗B − (1−A)⊗ (1−B) ≤ 1⊗ 1 +A⊗B,
for any 0 ≤ A,B ≤ 1. Therefore,
Πθ0 + Π
θ
1 ≤ 1 + Πθc ,
where Πθc is the projector for the “cross-game”, in which Bill has to unveil 0 and Brian has to unveil 1,
Πθc =
∑
x∈Cn
|xθ〉〈xθ | ⊗
∑
y∈Cn
dH(xS ,yS)≤δ
P 0y ⊗
∑
z∈Cn
dH(xT ,zT )≤δ
Q1z.
Clearly, tr
(
ρ[Πθ0 + Π
θ
1]
) ≤ 1 + tr (ρΠθc), which combined with (A5) gives
p0 + p1 ≤ 1 + 2−n
∑
θ∈Cn
tr
(
ρΠθc
)
= 1 + tr
(
ρ〈Πθc〉
) ≤ 1 + ||〈Πθc〉||,
where 〈·〉 denotes averaging over θ, i.e. 〈Πθc〉 = 2−n
∑
θ∈Cn Π
θ
c , and || · || denotes the Schatten ∞-norm. Changing the
order of summation in Πθc gives
Πθc =
∑
y,z∈Cn
∑
x∈Cn
dH(xS ,yS)≤δ
dH(xT ,zT )≤δ
|xθ〉〈xθ | ⊗ P 0y ⊗Q1z.
Now, it is clear that only the x-dependent part needs to be averaged:
〈Πθc〉 = 2−n
∑
θ∈Cn
Πθc =
∑
y,z∈Cn
Byz ⊗ P 0y ⊗Q1z,
where
Byz = 2
−n ∑
θ∈Cn
∑
x∈Cn
dH(xS ,yS)≤δ
dH(xT ,zT )≤δ
|xθ〉〈xθ |.
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The product P 0y ⊗Q1z yields orthogonal projectors so the norm of 〈Πθc〉 can be written as
||〈Πθc〉|| = max
y,z∈Cn
||Byz||. (A6)
To see which values of y and z maximize the norm we need to look more closely at the matrices Byz. For every θ
define u(θ) ∈ Cn to be the string that satisfies [u(θ)]S = yS and [u(θ)]T = zT . Relabelling x→ x⊕ u(θ) yields
Byz = 2
−n ∑
θ∈Cn
∑
x∈Cn
wH(xS)≤δ
wH(xT )≤δ
|(x⊕ u(θ))θ〉〈(x⊕ u(θ))θ |.
The constraints on the second sum can be relaxed by noting that wH(xS) ≤ δ and wH(xT ) ≤ δ implies wH(x) ≤ δ.
Hence,
Byz ≤ B′yz = 2−n
∑
θ∈Cn
∑
x∈Cn
wH(x)≤δ
|(x⊕ u(θ))θ〉〈(x⊕ u(θ))θ |.
Now the second sum is independent of θ, hence, the summation over θ can be performed first. The product structure
simplifies the summation
|xθ〉〈xθ | =
n⊗
k=1
|ψθkxk〉〈ψθkxk | and
∑
θ∈Cn
. . . ⇐⇒
n⊗
k=1
∑
θk∈{0,1}
. . . ,
which implies that
2−n
∑
θ∈Cn
|(x⊕ u(θ))θ〉〈(x⊕ u(θ))θ | =
n⊗
k=1
ρxk⊕yk,xk⊕zk .
where
ρb,c =
1
2
(|ψ0b 〉〈ψ0b |+ |ψ1c 〉〈ψ1c |).
for b, c ∈ {0, 1}. Note that ρb,c + ρ1−b,1−c = 1 so they are diagonal in the same eigenbasis. Therefore, without loss of
generality we can write
ρb,c =
∑
t∈{0,1}
λb⊕ct |eb⊕ct 〉〈eb⊕ct |,
for b, c ∈ {0, 1}, where λb⊕c0 + λb⊕c1 = 1. In particular, we have( n⊗
k=1
ρxk⊕yk,xk⊕zk
)( n⊗
k=1
|eyk⊕zkvk 〉
)
=
n⊗
k=1
λyk⊕zkxk⊕yk⊕vk |eyk⊕zkvk 〉.
Therefore, we also know the eigenbasis of
B′yz =
∑
x∈Cn
wH(x)≤δ
n⊗
k=1
ρxk⊕yk,xk⊕zk ,
and the highest eigenvalue equals simply
||B′yz|| = max
v∈Cn
∑
x∈Cn
wH(x)≤δ
n∏
k=1
λyk⊕zkxk⊕yk⊕vk .
Recall from (A6) that the expression we want to bound is
max
y,z∈Cn
||B′yz|| = max
v,y,z∈Cn
∑
x∈Cn
wH(x)≤δ
n∏
k=1
λyk⊕zkxk⊕yk⊕vk = maxa,b∈Cn
∑
x∈Cn
wH(x)≤δ
n∏
k=1
λakxk⊕bk .
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Solving this maximization is easy (see Appendix B for details) and yields
max
y,z∈Cn
||B′yz|| =
∑
x∈Cn
wH(x)≤δ
n∏
k=1
λxk =
bδnc∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
λn−k0 λ
k
1 ,
where λ0 = maxb,c λ
c
b and λ1 = 1− λ0. Finally, as we know that
||〈Πθc〉|| = max
y,z∈Cn
||Byz|| ≤ max
y,z∈Cn
||B′yz||
we obtain the security guarantee of the form presented in (A4) with
ε =
bδnc∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
λn−k0 λ
k
1 .
In the noiseless case (δ = 0) we obtain ε = λn0 , while for δ > 0 we use the Chernoff bound (D1) for the binomial
distribution to get
ε ≤ exp
(
− 1
2
(√
λ1 − δ√
λ1
)2
n
)
, (A7)
for any δ < λ1. It is also clear that the cross-game becomes easy for the dishonest parties if δ > λ1. Hence, λ1 is the
error threshold below which the cross-game becomes secure (asymptotically).
It is not clear whether the bit commitment game can be secure for any δ > λ1 but if that is the case it cannot be
proven using the cross-game reduction.
Finally, we want to connect λ1 to some measure of complementarity of the states emitted by Alice. We show in
Appendix C that
λ1 =
1− t
2
,
where t = maxb,c∈{0,1} |〈ψ0b |ψ1c 〉|. For example for the perfect BB84 states we get t = 1/
√
2 and λ = λ1 = 1/2 −
1/(2
√
2) ≈ 0.146.
c. Security for honest Bob
Since Alice does not receive any information from Bob before the open phase, she remains fully ignorant about the
value of his commitment.
5. Fault-tolerant RBC with backreporting
If Alice were to implement the protocol presented in Section A 4 using a Poisson-type source she would need to set
the mean number of photons very high so that the honest Bob detects clicks in the majority of rounds. However, then
the probability of multi-photon emissions becomes significant which allows dishonest Bob to cheat. Here, we present
a modified protocol, in which Bob is required to backreport the rounds he missed, which closes this security loophole.
a. The protocol
The new protocol admits three parameters: the error allowance, δ, the detection threshold, γ, and the mean number
of photons per pulse emitted by Alice, µ. We will see later that these paremeters determine the trade-off between
robustness and security.
1. In every round Alice’s agent Anne (A1) generates two uniformly random bits, xk, θk ∈ {0, 1}, and sends a pulse
of photons in the state |ψθx〉 to Bill (B1).
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2. (commit) Bill chooses the bit he wants to commit to, denoted by b. He measures all the incoming photons in
the computational basis if b = 0 or in the Hadamard basis if b = 1. Let y denote the string of measurement
outcomes.
3. (backreporting) Let M ⊆ [n] be the valid set, namely the rounds in which Bill detected a click. Bill sends
M to Anne. Anne checks whether m = |M| ≥ γn, otherwise she aborts the protocol. Denote the classical
measurement outcomes on the valid set by y ∈ {0, 1}m. Bill sends b and y to Brian (B2).
4. (open) To open the commitment Bill sends b and y to Anne and Brian does the same to Amy (A2). Let us
denote the respective variables by b′ and y′.
5. Amy forwards the string she received from Brian to Anne.
6. (verify) Let S and T be the following sets
S = {k ∈M : θk = 0},
T = {k ∈M : θk = 1}.
Note that these are essentially the sets defined in Section A 3 but truncated to the valid rounds only. Let xS(T )
be the substring of x on the set S(T ) Alice accepts the unveiling if the following three conditions are satisfied:
• Bill and Brian unveil the same value, b = b′.
• Bill and Brian submit the same outcome string, y = y′.
• The string y is consistent with Alice’s original encoding. More specifically, if b = 0 we require dH(xS , yS) ≤
δ, whereas if b = 1 we require dH(xT , yT ) ≤ δ.
The security for honest Bob follows straightforwardly from Assumption 3. If the probability of detecting a photon
does not depend on the basis chosen by Bob then there is no correlation between the valid set and Bob’s measurement
choice. Therefore, despite having received the valid set Alice remains fully ignorant about Bob’s measurement basis.
The remainder of the paper investigates the trade-off between robustness and security (for honest Alice). First,
we consider the asymptotic limit (the number of rounds goes to infinity) and we establish simple conditions that the
hardware and protocol parameters must satisfy for the protocol to be both robust and secure. These conditions define
a region in the space of parameters, which we call the feasible region, and essentially tell us how good the equipment
of the honest parties must be in order to implement the protocol securely. Finally, we show how to compute explicit
security bounds for finite n.
b. Asymptotic analysis
In the asymptotic limit all the random variables are concentrated around their average values. Therefore, to see for
what values of the parameters that the protocol is in principle feasible it is enough to calculate the relevant averages.
Robustness. In the honest scenario if Bob has received at least one photon he will consider the round valid. For
the protocol to go through he must have received at least γn non-vacuum rounds. Hence, what we care about in
the asymptotic limit is that the expected number of non-vacuum rounds (as observed by Bob) exceeds the detection
threshold,
∑∞
t=1 E[Nr] > γn. Expressing the expectation values through probabilities (A2) gives
∞∑
t=1
pr > γ.
Replacing the sum by 1− p0 and evaluating it using (A1) we get
e−µη + γ < 1.
If the first condition is satisfied then we only need to ensure that Bob’s error rate is below the threshold. As the
probability of making an error (obtaining the wrong outcome despite measuring in the right basis) in each round equals
Q, the expected Hamming distance between what Alice encoded and what Bob measured also equals Q. Therefore,
the second condition for robustness is Q < δ.
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Security for honest Alice In the case of dishonest Bob we assume that his fibre and detectors are perfect (η = 1,
Q = 0) and, also, let us make the following modification that gives (slightly) more power to Bob but also makes
the analysis simpler: we will replace all the vacuum rounds by single-photon emissions. Then, Nm :=
∑∞
k=2Nk, the
number of multi-photon emissions, becomes the only relevant parameter. If Bob receives two (or more) photons he
will measure the first photon in the Z basis and the second one in the X basis and he will obtain valid answers to
both questions (namely opening 0 and opening 1). This means that whichever bit he decides to unveil his answer
will always be accepted by Alice. Therefore, the multi-photon rounds Bob can “win” for free and such rounds do not
contribute to security. Hence, dishonest Bob’s optimal strategy will be to discard as many single-photon rounds as
possible. It is clear that if Bob can discard all of them, he is left with multi-photon emissions only and no security
is possible. Therefore, the first condition for security is: the number of multi-photon rounds is lower than Bob’s
detection threshold
Nm < dγne.
After using up the entire backreporting allowance the number of valid rounds is m = dγne but there are only dγne−Nm
(which is now guaranteed to be a positive number) single-photon rounds among them. Therefore, honest Alice thinks
that they are playing a standard bit commitment game of dγne rounds but there is a certain number of multi-photon
ones, which Bob can win “for free”. Hence, he can use his “error allowance” for the single-photon rounds and the
security we achieve is that of playing a game of dγne − Nm rounds with the non-fractional error allowance of δγn,
which gives the effective (fractional) error allowance of
δ′ =
δγn
dγne −Nm .
In the proof (Section A 4 b) we find that we can only prove security if the effective (fractional) error allowance, δ′,
satisfies
δ′ < λ1,
where λ measures how complementary the bases used by Alice are. Hence, in our case we require
δγn < (dγne −Nm)λ1. (A8)
In the asymptotic limit we look at the expectation value:
E[Nm] = [1− e−µ(1 + µ)]n,
which applied to (A8) gives
e−µ(1 + µ) + (1− δ
λ1
)γ > 1.
Asymptotically feasible region. The asymptotically feasible region is defined as the region in the space of parameters
that satisfies the robustness and security constraints, namely:
e−µη + γ < 1,
Q < δ,
e−µ(1 + µ) + (1− δ
λ1
)γ > 1.
It is clear that the first two inequalities (the robustness conditions) can be assumed to be equalities, which fixes δ
and γ and leaves us with only one, but fairly complicated, condition:
e−µ(1 + µ) + (1− Q
λ1
)(1− e−µη) > 1.
This expression allows to verify whether for devices of given quality (quanitified by λ1, Q and η) there exists µ that
makes the protocol both robust and secure.
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c. Finite-size effects
The asymptotic analysis is relevant as n → ∞ but in any practical scenario the number of rounds will be finite.
Alice and Bob, having performed the protocol, will want explicit security guarantees (as a function of n). Note that
robustness is verified experimentally, hence, there is no need to calculate it and security for honest Bob is perfect by
assumption. Therefore, we are only left with security for honest Alice.
Let E denote the event that Bob wins the cross-game. As shown in Section A 4 b, Pr[E] is an upper bound on the
security parameter of the bit commitment protocol. Conditioning on the number of multi-photon emissions yields
Pr[E] =
n∑
k=0
Pr[E|Nm = k] Pr[Nm = k]. (A9)
Equation (A7) allows us to bound Pr[E|Nm = k] as long as the number of multi-photon emissions is below the
threshold, kt = γn(1− δ/λ1). For k < kt we have
Pr[E|Nm = k] ≤ exp
(
− 1
2
(√
(γn− k)λ1 − δγn√
(γn− k)λ1
)2)
, (A10)
whereas for k ≥ kt there is no security and the trivial bound, Pr[E|Nm = k] ≤ 1, is the best we can hope for. Noting
that the random variable Nm is Poisson-distributed with the parameter pm = 1 − e−µ(1 + µ) allows us to evaluate
the bound numerically.
Appendix B: A simple maximization problem
Suppose one is given two coins and is required to make n independent coin flips. The goal is to maximize the
probability of guessing correctly at least a certain fraction of the outcome string. Which coin should be used in every
round and what is the optimal guess? Intuitively, it is clear that one should pick the more biased coin and always
guess its more probable outcome. For completeness we provide a rigorous proof of this statement.
For b, c ∈ {0, 1} let λcb ∈ [0, 1] be such that
∑
b λ
c
b = 1. In other words, b corresponds to the outcome, while c tells
us which coin has been used. Let y ∈ Cn be the string denoting which coin was used in each round and let X be the
random variable corresponding to the string of outcomes. Then for x ∈ Cn
Pr[X = x] =
n∏
k=1
λykxk .
For an arbitrary string z ∈ Cn the probability of being correct on at least n(1− δ) position equals
Pr[dH(X, z) ≤ δ] =
∑
x∈Cn
dH(x,z)≤δ
n∏
k=1
λykxk =
∑
x∈Cn
wH(x)≤δ
n∏
k=1
λykxk⊕zk .
Now, we want to see what values of y, z ∈ Cn maximize this expression. Let us write down the summation corre-
sponding to the j-th bit explicitly∑
x∈Cn
wH(x)≤δ
n∏
k=1
λykxk⊕zk = λ
yj
zj
[ ∑
x∈Cn−1
wH(x)≤nδ/(n−1)
∏
k 6=j
λykxk⊕zk
]
+ (1− λyjzj )
[ ∑
x∈Cn−1
wH(x)≤(nδ−1)/(n−1)
∏
k 6=j
λykxk⊕zk
]
.
As the first square bracket is never smaller than the second one (because all the terms counted in the second bracket
are also counted in the first one) we should always maximize λ
yj
zj . This observation is always true, regardless of the
choices made for other rounds, and it applies to every round in the same way. Therefore, if λ0 = maxb,c λ
c
b and
λ1 = 1− λ0 we find
max
z∈Cn
Pr[dH(X, z) ≤ δ] =
∑
v∈Cn
wH(v)≤δ
n∏
k=1
λvk =
bδnc∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
λn−k0 λ
k
1 ,
which recovers the intuitively correct solution.
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Appendix C: Explicit diagonalisation of a mixture of two pure states
Let |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 be two pure states such that 〈ψ0 |ψ1〉 = ceiφ. Then the eigenvalue decomposition of ρ =
1
2 (|ψ0〉〈ψ0 |+ |ψ1〉〈ψ1 |) is
ρ = λ+|e+〉〈e+ |+ λ−|e−〉〈e− |,
where
λ± =
1± c
2
,
|e±〉 = 1√
2(1 + c)
[
|ψ0〉 ± e−iφ|ψ1〉
]
.
Appendix D: Chernoff bounds for the binomial distribution [25]
Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be independent random variables taking on values 0 or 1. Then let X =
∑n
i=1Xi and µ be the
expectation value of X. Then for any δ > 0 the following inequalities hold.
Pr[X < (1− δ)µ] <
(
e−δ
(1− δ)1−δ
)µ
≤ exp
(
− µδ
2
2
)
,
Pr[X > (1 + δ)µ] <
(
eδ
(1 + δ)1+δ
)µ
≤ exp
(
− µδ
2
3
)
.
The bounds can be expressed more conveniently as
Pr[X < s] < exp
(
− 1
2
(√
µ− s√
µ
)2)
, (D1)
Pr[X > s] <
(µ
s
)s
es−µ. (D2)
Appendix E: Remarks on Quantum Advantage
1. Remarks 1
Note that our protocol requires no communication from A1 or A2 at commitment or unveiling. These agents need
trusted spacetime coordinates and reliable classical data storage, but do not need secure sites to keep data secret
before or during the protocol: Alice may keep the secret data about her quantum states at some other secure site for
later cross-checking. No unconditionally secure classical bit commitment protocol (relativistic or otherwise) allows
this freedom, which is potentially valuable in the technologically asymmetric case where Alice is less able than Bob
to maintain a network of secure sites. Conversely, if Alice shares the quantum state information securely with A1 and
A2 and they keep it securely, Bob’s cheating possibilities are quite constrained. If Bob cheats at commitment, i.e. B1
and B2 send different bit values for b
′, he will be exposed as soon as A1 and A2 crosscheck, whether or not he unveils.
If they send the same b′ and Bob unveils at any time between tc and tc + (d/2c), but tries to cheat at this stage, at
least one of the Ai will learn instantly – without needing to cross-check – since he must send inconsistent information
about b to at least one of them. Again, no unconditionally secure classical bit commitment protocol has this last
feature, which allows (in a relativistically appropriate sense) instant action to be taken in the event of cheating at the
unveiling stage.
2. Remarks 2
In the main part of our manuscript, we already briefly touched upon different security models [20, 21]. In particular,
one can see [20] our two site protocol as achieving security in a setting where communication is not allowed during
certain phases of the protocol. For a bit commitment protocol, one can thereby distinguish several natural phases,
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namely the commit phase, the wait phase, and finally the open and verification phase. One can then ask whether
security is possible if communication is not possible in any of these phases.
This model is interesting because, while imposing minimum communication constraints necessary to evade the
impossibility result [20, Sec. III.A], it is also sufficiently strong to allow for secure quantum bit commitment. One
can show that no classical protocol implemented in this model can be secure [20, Sec. IV.B]. From the above descrip-
tion of the setup with multiple agents occupying different locations (see Fig. 1-b), we can readily deduce that the
communication restraints are satisfied. However, the setup enforces even stronger communication constraints. For an
in-depth discussion and illustrations concerning the different phases of bit commitment and communication models
we refer to [20].
In [20] it was shown that there is a strict quantum advantage when we take the minimum number of phases in which
communication is not allowed, namely the wait and open phase. Communication during the open phase, however,
was possible. As mentioned before, the significant distance between Singapore and Geneva naturally guarantees such
a lack of communication and thus enables secure bit commitment.
However, since of course the locations of our experimental labs are fixed to be in Geneva and Singapore, the distance
also guarantees a lack of communication already during the commit phase itself. This scenario, when communication
is never allowed, has long been studied in computer science [26], where in particular it is known that there exists a
classical protocol for bit commitment that is secure as long as communication is never possible at all (see e.g. [20]
for further background). Similar protocols were derived using relativistic assumptions [15, 16], whose first round
is closely related to [26]. The classical protocol of [26] is secure against all quantum attacks ([16]; see also [27]),
essentially because a successful quantum attack would imply the possibility of communication between the separate
sites. However, these classical protocols would not be secure even against classical attacks if communication were
possible during the commit phase, and so the two site quantum protocol implemented here would offer a theoretical
advantage in such a setting.
It is a very interesting open question, whether there exists an natural experimentally implementable physical
scenario in which communication during the commit phase is allowed, but communication during the wait and open
phase is forbidden.
Looking at the protocol of [26] one could imagine that supplementing special relativity with the assumption that
only a finite amount of communication is possible within a given time frame, and that an infinitesimally small point
in space can, by the holographic priniciple, not store an arbitrary amount of randomness — required to execute the
protocol of [26] — can possibly lead to such a scenario. However, these are only clues we can derive from a particular
classical protocol [26] and they do not by itself answer this interesting open question.
Appendix F: Extension for three agents
Suppose that Bob sites his third agent, B0, equidistant from B1 and B2 on the shorter arc of a great circle joining
them and preshare b and r(b) among all three agents, while Alice locates her third agent, A0, right next to B0. Then,
instead of B1 and B2 committing the bit a = b⊕ b′, B0 can do so by sending b′ to A0 at tc, while B1 and B2 unveil by
sending b and r(b) at tc +d/(2c). This allows B0 to commit to a bit as soon as he learns it, without presharing it with
B1 and B2, while Alice is guaranteed that Bob’s agents have collectively committed him from tc until tc + d/(2c).
This freedom to commit bits in real time could be made more practical if the Bi preshare a large number of
quantumly generated random bits bj and commitment data r
(bj) and if B1 and B2 release these in rapid sequence at
coordinated times pre-agreed with B0. B0 can then commit a bit a = bj ⊕ b′ at any time of his choice, by sending A0
both b′ and the value j (chosen so that the unveiling times of r(bj) guarantee commitment for roughly tc + (d/(2c)).
Adding a third site adds logistical complexity but no significant technological challenge beyond those addressed in
our implementation, which thus demonstrates the practicality of secure real time relativistic quantum commitment
of bits acquired at a single location.
